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-Sons of the thief, sons of the saint
Who is the child with no complaint'
-Suffer the little children ....
This short book, recently issued in paperback, is the third in a contro-
versial series designed to revolutionize the "[child] custody business."3 The
first and second books, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (BBIC) and
Before the Best Interests of the Child (BBIC II),' dealt with the incendi-
ary questions of what principles should govern child custody decisions and
when the state has the right to intervene in private family arrangements.
This last volume deals with the problems and responsibilities arising in
the many disciplines that become involved in the placement of a child
when her biological family fails.
* T. WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE scene eleven (1974).
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Yale Law
School LL.B., 1951.
1. Brel, Sons of, in JACQUES BREL IS ALIVE AND WELL, AND LIVING IN PARIS 142 (E. Blau ed.
1971).
2. Mark 10:14 (King James).
3. Fineman & Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determina-
tions at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 139 n.97.
4. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. Solirr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (new
ed. with epilogue 1979) [hereinafter BBIC]; J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNi, BEFORE THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) [hereinafter BBIC II]. It is puzzling why, after debunking
the "best interests" formulation for child custody decisions in their first book, BBIC, the authors went
on to immortalize the phrase in their next two books, BBIC II, and J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A.
SOLNIT & S. GOLDSTEIN, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986) [IBIC; hereinafter by page
number only].
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I. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT
In 1974, BBIC offered bright-line principles based on psychoanalytic
theory to guide social agency workers and juvenile court judges in custody
fights over children. Four principles stood out. First, it is best to permit
minimal state interference in functioning family life-"leaving well
enough alone."5 The authors stress the limits of law as a tool for cor-
recting dysfunctions in the family unit: "At best and at most, law can
provide a new opportunity for the relationship between a child and an
adult to unfold free of coercive meddling by the state."6 Second, in cases of
irreconcilable interfamily or intrafamily disputes, award sole custody to
the "psychological parent" or "primary caretaker." Third, preserve con-
tinuing relationships between the child and the psychological parent.
Fourth, allow the child's time frame to govern; if the relationship between
a young child and a parent is interrupted for more than two years, pre-
sume it no longer exists. At all times the child's need for a steady primary
caretaker should control custody decisionmaking. Whether parents are to
blame for not being there is irrelevant. Quick and final placement of a
child into a family setting is paramount. 7
The implications of such principles are profound. Custody decrees be-
tween divorcing parents would be final and not subject to modification for
"changed circumstances." Neither joint custody nor compulsory visitation
rights would be awarded. The parent in charge of the child would have
absolute control over that child's contact with the other parent. A prospec-
tive mother who signed her child away for adoption would thereafter have
no opportunity to recant, and qualified adoptive parents would not need
wait out any trial period before becoming the child's legal parents. In
addition, a mother returned from prison or parents who have helped a
child to escape tyranny by sending him abroad could not automatically
claim the child back if in the interim the child had forged psychological
bonds to others.
BBIC became a storm center.' Feminists criticized it for downplaying
the nurturing roles of mothers and the maternal preferences that had been
5. BBIC, supra note 4, at 8.
6. Id. at 115.
7. See, e.g., id. at 40-42, 48-49, 79.
8. The reader of BBIC will understand the immediate appeal of many of its tenets. For example,
BBIC argues that after a change of mind, parents should not be able solely on the basis of biological
ties to wrench a happy child away from foster or adoptive parents who have won the child's love and
affection. Neither should they be able to hang on to the name, but not the obligations, of parenthood
by refusing to let their children escape the limbo of foster homes. But the same reader may find it
more difficult to accept corollary theses like the absolute prerogatives of one natural parent to control
the other's contact with a child or the notion that the state may not interfere where both parents agree
on a custody arrangement even if neither party is cast in the role of the psychological parent. Thus,
parents may consign a child to boarding school or to a mental institution so long as they agree. If they
disagree on Sunday visits by an absent father, however, the caretaker parent wins. It is a tidy scheme,
but is it always in the interests of the child?
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used to guide custody decisions for children of tender years. Fathers'
groups who worried about visitation rights were vehement.' Natural par-
ents viewed their rights as threatened. Juvenile court judges and juvenile
agency personnel worried that their powers to decide the "best interests of
the child" would be drastically limited in favor of a mechanical applica-
tion of the BBIC rules. 10
Despite conflicting responses, BBIC quickly became "that which every-
one must mention or risk being seen as an ignorant provincial."" Its
guiding principles worked their way into just about everything from the
reports of national planning commissions to the handbooks for social
workers. 2
The second book in the trilogy, BBIC II, appeared six years later. Fo-
cusing on when the state may legitimately intrude upon a family relation-
ship, this book was, if anything, even more controversial.1 The authors
declared themselves one hundred percent behind "parental autonomy"
and "family integrity." 4 Before the state should intervene, they said, the
child must be in serious physical danger, the parents must be irreparably
at odds with one another over the child's custody, or one family must be
fiercely vying with another (usually natural versus adoptive or foster par-
ents). BBIG II's message was consistent with BBIC's thesis that con-
tinuity of care is paramount. State officials must err on the side of ex-
treme caution in taking a child from his present caretakers. Only a
certifiably insane parent or one convicted of a sexual offense against a
child should provide sufficient grounds for state intervention.' 5 Only a
threat of severe bodily injury justifies a neglect proceeding. Emotional rav-
aging, no matter how severe, is not justification for intervention." Parents
may do anything they want with their children that is not strictly forbid-
den by law. The only circumstances in which lifesaving medical care
should be provided for a child over parents' objections are those in which
9. Fineman & Opie, supra note 3, at 143.
10. Davis, "There is a Book Out.. .". An Analysis ofjudicial Absorption of Legislative Facts,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1553-59 (1987) (documenting tendency of some but not all courts to
eschew simple application of formulae in favor of more thorough analysis of facts of each case).
11. Crouch, An Essay on the Critical and Judicial Reception of Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child, 13 FAM. L.Q. 49, 50 (1979) (collection of conflicting responses to BBIC).
12. See Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 449 n.127 (1983)
(citing NAT'L COMM'N ON CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS, WHO KNOWS? WHO CARES? FOR-
GOTTEN CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 10 (1979) and V. PIKE, S. DOWNS, A. EMLEN, G. DOWNS &
D. CASE, PERMANENT PLANNING FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: A HANDBOOK FOR SOCIAL
WORKERS 14 (1977)).
13. Some criticized the book for its "very restrictive standards for state intervention into the fam-
ily, (compared to] . . . standards for termination of parental rights for children in foster care." Id. at
449 n.126; see also Wald, Book Review, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 645, 648 (1980) (authors' grounds for
state intervention are too narrow, and "basic premises supporting nonintervention are often
unpersuasive").
14. BBIC II, supra note 4, at 9.
15. Id. at 62.
16. Id. at 75.
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(1) the treatment is nonexperimental, (2) the child would die without it,
and (3) the care would give the child the prospect of a reasonably good
life. Outside of a neglect proceeding, psychiatric treatment should never
be imposed on a child against the parents' wishes."7
The BBIC II formula for intervention would in general allow, indeed
require, legal representation for a child when the parents wanted it, but
not when they resisted it. Thus, legal representation presumably would be
unavailable to a child if the parents were willing to side with the state
against the child in cases of removal from school ("let him be expelled, it
will teach him a lesson" or "we're embarrassed by this deformed child, we
don't want him in school") or in cases in which they agreed on institution-
alization of the child ("take him away, we can't stand it any longer").
The authors would even deny children the right to counsel during a neg-
lect proceeding prior to an adjudication against their parents.'8
Behind this extreme pro-family stance is the authors' first principle that
family integrity deserves every benefit of the doubt. In marginal cases it is
better to impose on the child risks of nonintervention, such as emotional
havoc, unnecessary institutionalization, and loss of education, rather than
risks of over-intervention, i.e., family disruption. 9
And, indeed, among some commentators, there was agreement that
BBIC II's aggressive defense of parental rights might be justified as a long
17. See, e.g., id. at 62, 72, 77, 91; cf. id at 33.
18. Id. at 112-14. The authors argue that appointment of an independent counsel for the child
will change the parental relationship. Of course, they are right. As parents well know, every authority
figure with whom a child enters into a relationship-teacher, coach, doctor, high school coun-
selor-does just that. Yet, can the child neglect system have any integrity if a child suspected of being
neglected has no independent representative in the proceeding? I would opt to have counsel appointed
more frequently than the authors suggest-when there is a reasonable probability of neglect. Sensitive
counsel would quickly evaluate the situation. If it is not one of child neglect, counsel will side with the
parents, and there will be no state interference. But if counsel perceives child neglect, she has an
important function to perform in protecting the child's best interests.
I also find it interesting that the authors do not discuss at greater length the troubling PINS (per-
sons in need of supervision) jurisdiction of juvenile courts under which children may be institutional-
ized at the request of their parents for noncriminal conduct, sometimes simply because the parents
cannot get along with or control the child. See IJA-ABA JuVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT,
STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR 1, 74 (Tent. Draft 1977). Parents certainly
should not dictate a child's right to counsel in that situation. See BBIC II, supra note 4, at 28 n.29.
19. In this respect, the supposed lessons of the case studies in BBIC II are not self-explanatory.
The authors defend the exclusion of emotional injury in their "serious bodily injury" standard
through case studies that supposedly illustrate "the strange paradox which characterizes child place-
ment law," BBIC II, supra note 4, at 85, with regard to overintervention in some cases and under-
intervention in others. Yet, the case studies cited there do not favor making a distinction between
physical and emotional damage. See id. at 86-90. Rather, they emphasize the risks of underinterven-
tion and overintervention when state agents are overworked and have incomplete information about
family situations. One case involved alleged emotional harm where, in hindsight, it was clear that
intervention was unnecessary. See id. at 83-85 (Alsager case). Another case involved physical abuse
where, again in hindsight, it was clear the state should have intervened earlier to protect the child. See
id. at 144-82 (murder of seven-year-old Maria Colwell by her parents). Physical harm is probably
more easily ascertainable than emotional harm, and thus the ascertaining leaves less room for state
error and abuse. However, the fact that the state made bad choices in these two cases has little or
nothing to do with whether the state should intervene in cases of emotional abuse.
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overdue corrective against bureaucratic intrusion into family life.2" But
others complained that the authors went too far, drew too bright a line,
closed too many doors against help for a child caught in an abusive family
situation." Critics worried about the extreme cases. While dutiful, caring
parents of a gravely ill child were better life-and-death decisionmakers
than a distant state apparatus, not-so-dutiful parents who left a child in
the hands of a succession of transient caretakers hardly seemed as deserv-
ing of the right to make those decisions. Readers were left with a gnawing
doubt: If psychological parenting was the keystone of family jurispru-
dence, should not parents forfeit the right to family autonomy when they
ceased functioning as parents, either through de facto abandonment or
psychologically abusive behavior? While precise rules might make sense in
a specific instance of a child teetering between life and death, they do not
always work so well for the multitudinous situations arising in the every-
day life of a healthy child.
20. A capsulized and necessarily oversimplified history of pre-BBIC theory may be in order here.
The "parental rights" theory of child placement came first, developing from "an almost mystical belief
in the superiority of biological parents." Recent Development, Jurisdiction, Standing, and Decision
Standards in Parent-Nonparent Custody Disputes, 58 WASH. L. REV. 111, 116 (1982) (citing Behn
v. Timmons, 345 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)). Later on, even in the face of growing
concern for the child's welfare "and the disappearance of the concept of the child as property," the
parental rights doctrine often was justified by "the assumption that a natural parent will most ade-
quately fulfill his child's needs." Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes
Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 155 (1963).
The "best interests of the child" doctrine appeared early in the nineteenth century. In 1824, Justice
Story relied on the "best interests" standard in a custody dispute between a child's father and grandfa-
ther. See United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31-32 (No. 15,256) (D.R.I. 1824) (court must look to
"the real, permanent interests of the infant; and if the infant be of sufficient discretion, it will also
consult its personal wishes"). The Supreme Court applied the best interests test in 1906. See New
York Foundling Hosp. v. Gatti, 203 U.S. 429, 439 (1906) (habeas corpus proceeding involving cus-
tody of child decided upon court's view of "best interests" and "welfare" of child).
Jurisdictions that applied the parental rights doctrine focused entirely on the "fitness" of the par-
ent. Even if a child had been in third-party custody for years, courts in these jurisdictions tended to
return the child to a "fit" parent, notwithstanding the disruption caused to the child. See Recent
Development, supra, at 116. The "best interests" jurisdictions took a broader view, often permitting
wide judicial discretion as to by whom and under what conditions the child would best be nurtured.
That discretion allowed judges to award custody based on their social policy views about the parents'
sometimes controversial lifestyles. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children, 28
STAN. L. REv. 623, 639-41 (1976) (coercive intervention often harmful to both children and parents).
Custody law in different jurisdictions (and even within the same jurisdictions) often careened back
and forth between the two standards. BBIC's goal was to define with more precision and predictabil-
ity what the "best interests" of the child were, as an alternative to ad hoc judicial decrees. While
rejecting absolute "parental rights," BBIC retained a vigorous presumption in favor of current care-
takers' rights.
21. Compare Appleton, Book Review, 58 TEx. L. REv. 1343, 1359 (1980) (stating that BBIC II
"succeeds in putting family privacy into the right place") with Besharov, Book Review, 34 VAND. L.
REv. 481, 483 (1981) (noting "the occasional overbreadth of [the authors'] definitions" and the "in-
flexibility of their decisionmaking rules").
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II. PARAMETERS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
COMPARTMENTALIZATION OF ROLES AND VALUES
Published in 1986, In the Best Interests of the Child (IBIC) explores
and instructs on the ways in which professional participants in child cus-
tody proceedings should conduct themselves, regardless of the substantive
laws or rules which govern. The book emanates from clinical material
gathered from the authors' own experiences and from their discussions of
case reports. This reliance is, in my view, a healthy one. By contrast to
the previous books in the trilogy, IBIC gleans patterns and even principles
from accumulated experience and empirical data, rather than announcing
first principles and then proving or applying them. In addition, the au-
thors claim "not [to] reopen questions addressed in the earlier volumes."22
Their concern "is more with the practices of professional persons than
with the substance of their recommendations or decisions.
The authors' advice to participants in the child placement process at
first seems unexceptionable. Social workers, psychiatrists, lawyers, and
judges alike should remain aware that they cannot individually or collec-
tively replace an "ordinary devoted parent.' 24 They must engage in con-
stant self-examination to distinguish between beliefs based on professional
training and field experience (which are permissible) and beliefs based on
personal values (which are not).25 The authors would have professionals
coordinate with other experts in the process but refrain from exceeding
their own competence or authority.28 And professionals must avoid the
dangers of playing dual and potentially conflicting roles vis-a-vis the child
or his parents.27 Judges must not try to be psychiatrists; 28 placement
agency personnel must not let their predictions about what the judge will
do guide their actions;29 lawyers must not predict what will happen psy-
chologically to the child under varying home scenarios." The book does
indeed provide chilling examples of how a little knowledge of another's
expertise can be a dangerous thing and can corrupt a professional's best
use of her own expertise.31
Yet, just as no child escapes his genes, throughout IBIC the reader is
pulled back to the hard-line starting assumptions of the first two books:
Each person in the process is a usurper of parental authority who must







28. See, e.g., pp. 21-31.
29. See, e.g., pp. 72-74.
30. See, e.g., pp. 31-34.
31. See, e.g., pp. 21-31, 72-74.
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field, and not on instinct or personal experience outside that field (and
particularly not on personal experience as a parent). Once family integrity
is rent, it is rent for all time. When "the all-encompassing parental task"
is broken up and temporarily divided among specialists from law,
medicine, child development, child care, social work, education, and other
professions, the sum of the parts can never equal the whole of a parent.
3 2
IBIC warns child placement professionals of the dangers attendant on
letting personal values color opinions that ought to be based solely upon
professional knowledge and experience. 3 But boundaries between "facts"
learned in years of experience with troubled families and "values" learned
in years of living are, as the authors concede," hard to define. They do
not explain how professionals can keep personal and professional values
compartmentalized. In fact, the authors themselves mingle the two. They
freely admit their own personal preferences for minimal state intervention
into family life and for making the child's interests paramount in the
placement process, values that are the heart and soul of their first two
books.3 5 They also conclude that their professional training as child devel-
opment specialists points them in the same direction as their personal
preferences, towards the conclusion that children need continuity of care
above all else.3" I wonder how many other placement participants simi-
larly will find in their untidy disciplines the ideas and empirical data to
bolster their own preferences. Especially when professional training and
personal values reinforce one another, it is not easy to tell where one ends
and the other begins. For instance, it is unclear whether it is personal
preference or professional training that leads the authors to find that
physical injury of a child is justifiable cause for state intervention but
emotional injury is not.
The authors also caution participants in the child placement process not
to exceed the limits of their professional training.3" There is no place, they
say, for instinct, hunch, or life's seasoning in their jobs. While some pro-
fessional leaders are prescribing a return to a view of the doctor or lawyer
as holistic counselor, IBIC advocates a more fragmented view of the roles
of the participants in the child placement process.
This principle may be sound, but the authors do not apply it consist-
ently in all their illustrations. Paradoxically, the authors find it acceptable
32. Pp. 4-5.
33. See supra text accompanying note 25. The caution to professionals here is similar to the
persistent cry for judicial restraint: Judges must in no way let their personal views of preferences
intrude upon decisionmaking. This is impossible! The truth lies on the mid-ground. If the law is
clear, then a judge's views cannot change it. If it is unclear, then the judge must balance equities,
predictions, past precedent, and other things to arrive at a result (it is, after all, her job to make
decisions); personal philosophy rarely can be kept entirely out of it.
34. Pp. 15-19.
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for other parent substitutes in the child's world, such as teachers and day
care workers, to act as surrogate parents so long as the parent has con-
sented. But a child may not be able to distinguish between parentally ap-
proved and disapproved surrogates. According to their prescription, the
authors rightfully criticize the judge who told the child to come see him if
she had any problems in her new placement and then was unavailable
when she did.3" Why then do they applaud the young doctor who com-
forts a frightened child fighting anesthesia by drawing on the soothing
techniques of the doctor's own mother, something certainly not taught in
medical school?"'
The child from a torn family may need to rely on the kindness of stran-
gers. Lines between professional courtesy and parent-like solicitude are
not easy to draw, and in a pinch it may be better to err on the side of
parent-like generosity than to insist on professional restraint. Isn't it a
more important criterion for a professional to follow through on a com-
mitment to a child even if it means occasionally overstepping disciplinary
fences? Besides, implementing a minimalist philosophy for professionalism
may deprive children of honest affection felt by the professionals with
whom they have contact during the placement process.
Some of the authors' most valuable advice to professionals concerns
avoidance of conflicting roles in the placement process. IBIC wisely urges
that a therapist should not simultaneously try to treat a troubled family
and conduct an investigation of child care in that family; a child psychia-
trist treating a child should not advise the court with which parent he
should be placed; a therapist treating an abusive parent should not advise
the court about the dangers of returning the child to that parent.4 In my
view, however, two prominent participants in the placement process defy
compartmentalization: the child's lawyer and the juvenile court judge.
A. Child Advocate as Mini-judge or Amicus Curiae?
Although there is near unanimity that potential conflicts abound in the
lawyer's role in the child custody process, the authors are not daunted. In
IBIC they apply to the role of child advocate principles originally set out
in BBIC. The lawyer, they assert, should not merely respond to the child;
he should whenever possible take instructions from the child's parents.
Where the parents are themselves under scrutiny (as in neglect, abuse, or
custody cases), the lawyer should on his own decide what is in the best
interests of the child. 1 Where the lawyer encounters particular difficulty
in assessing the psychological implications of the child's asserted desires or
38. Pp. 98-102.
39. Pp. 112-14.
40. See pp. 81-87.
41. See BBIC, supra note 4, at 65-67.
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behavior, he should consult a child development specialist or psycholo-
gist.42 In essence, the advocate, despite his purportedly adversarial role,
must become a mini-judge of the child's best interests.
One of the most important byproducts of the Supreme Court's ground-
breaking decision in In Re Gault was to secure a child's right to a real
lawyer dedicated to his interests, not merely access to a counselor to the
court.'3 More traditional schools of thought would tell a child's lawyer to
"behave as a lawyer whose client simply happened to be a child."'44 Ad-
mittedly, a traditional lawyer-client relationship with a five-year-old may
not always make much sense; a very young child alone cannot entirely
dictate the position of the lawyer. Thus there is some merit to the authors'
suggestion of a more integrated, discretionary role for lawyers.
Some aspects of the recommendation, however, may need further
thought. Indeed, on balance, it is unclear exactly what function IBIC
would have the child's lawyer serve. For example, it seems that an amicus
curiae appointed by the court could do just as well in performing the
advisory duties that the authors recommend. More importantly, limiting
the input of a child advocate to legal expertise may shortchange the child.
With older children, the child's perceived desires should always be given
primary consideration, and counsel should remain especially alert to po-
tential conflicts between a young client's welfare and her parents'
agenda.' 5 In short, IBIC downplays too much the child's input into his
counsel's decision.
For instance, I believe the authors have fundamentally misread Gault
to guarantee counsel to a child who has been threatened with incarcera-
42. See pp. 31-34, 51.
43. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-42 (1967).
44. Note, Lauyering For The Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation
Disputes Arising From Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1138 (1978). Proponents of this school also
suggest that a lawyer should neither impose his values on the parent and child nor express his per-
sonal views to the factfinder. See, e.g., Guggenheim, The Right To Be Represented But Not Heard:
Reflections On Legal Representation For Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 76, 101, 155 (1984).
45. The legal issue of "children's rights" rose to prominence in the 1970's. Lawyers representing
children litigated most of the important issues. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)
(institutionalized child's right to receive decent care and enough training to curb violent behavior);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (adolescent girl's right to abortion without parental consent);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (child's right not to be committed to mental institution without
due process and representation); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (child's right not to be sus-
pended or expelled from school without due process); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (child's right to go to school); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(child's right to beyond a reasonable doubt standard in cases of law violations); Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (child's right to peacefully protest on political issues in school); In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (child's right not to be committed to delinquency institution); Mills v.
Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (handicapped child's right to receive publicly-
funded education). Of course, in many of these cases, the interests of the parents and children were
allied; examples are Gault and Tinker. In others, however, they clearly were not. See, e.g., Yoder, 406
U.S. at 241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (religious views and educational goals of child may
diverge from parents'); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647 (parents may obstruct child's right to abortion and
access to court); Parham, 442 U.S. at 631-32 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (commitment context
signals disruption in family unit).
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tion only if his parents request counsel.4 This is an interpretation of the
case which, to my knowledge, no juvenile court in the country has fol-
lowed. Nor can I find any support in the Constitution for the authors'
contended right of a child "to be represented by his parents before the
law."4  That formulation seems a case of a reasonable principle taken to
an unreasonable extreme.
B. The Judge's Dilemma: No Place Else To Go
The judge's role is the most enigmatic piece in the IBIC scheme for
keeping all professionals in their proper place. She remains the ultimate
decisionmaker. Yet, under a strict application of the IBIC code, a judge,
like the other players, must downplay her value preferences, parenting
experience, and all bits of knowledge accumulated from other disciplines
over the years. Thus, the IBIC formula leaves the judge as naked as the
storybook emperor whose helpers prove incompetent at their jobs or desert
her outright.48 As the authors themselves point out, sometimes there is no
clear answer for the judge, no matter whose principles she uses, particu-
larly in cases lacking explicit statutory directives or adequate expert
witnesses.
The authors' desire to stamp out judicial discretion takes odd turns.
The authors suggest that, if experts cannot, or should not,49 agree on the
psychological parent, the judge may supervise a tiebreaker lottery.50 Is it
so clear, though, that a child lottery is preferable to letting a judge use her
own judgment based on cumulative knowledge from whatever sources? Of
course, when even those experts happy to render an opinion on who is the
psychological parerit disagree, the judge must choose between them. Simi-
larly she must be ready to puncture pretensions to expertise the experts do
not possess. How does the judge pick between jousting experts except by
evaluating their persuasiveness and demeanor, the validity of their obser-
vations, and the comparative weight of their credentials? And how can she
evaluate these except by using her worldliness, extradisciplinary knowl-
edge, and even personal experiences?
The call for a diminished role for judges in all three of the "Best Inter-
ests" books reflects a wider movement in this country to limit judicial
46. See BBIC II, supra note 4, at 128-29 (rejecting Gault as authority that "attorney could
independently represent the child over the parents' objection").
47. Id. at 114; see also id. at 128-29.
48. The authors do, however, "expect these professional persons to reflect wisdom based on their
experience not only as specialists but as human beings possessed of ordinary knowledge." Pp. 120-21.
49. In one case, the authors commend a child psychiatrist for refusing to give an expert opinion
on who was the "psychological parent" in a case in which two young boys had grown up with their
mother in a war-torn country, had been separated from her for almost eighteen months when she sent
them to live with an American couple, and had apparently formed no "psychological parent" ties with
their foster parents. The psychiatrist said only that the children needed permanency, but not with
whom. The judge had to render a decision without help from the experts. See pp. 39-44.
50. P. 68 n.25.
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discretion. Increasingly we hear calls-often strident-for judicial re-
straint and demands for heightened deference by the courts to other politi-
cal agencies, and we see rigid grids drawn within which judges must mete
out sentences for criminal offenders. Some cabining of judicial discretion
may be justifiable, especially in the family court arena, where until re-
cently very few such limits existed. But my own reaction to these books is
that the authors' urge to rein in judges' inevitable discretion in child
placement decisions has become a goal almost equal to that of the best
interests of the child. Unfortunate examples of judges intruding too far
into family life, and on occasion substituting their own values and judg-
ments for those of parents do not prove that all judicial discretion should
be wiped out, even if it were possible to do so.
The most internally contradictory aspect of IBIC's treatment of judicial
discretion is the authors' belief that judges as well as legislatures should
codify the trilogy's rules of law and preference schemes for placement de-
cisions. 1 They appended to their second book a model statute and a
model judicial decision. In IBIG they commend a judge for basing his
decision on "Best Interests" principles. The authors used the case as an
example of "the way in which expert knowledge--here about a child's
need for continuity-can gradually enter case law and in a limited way,
as precedent, become a part of the professional equipment of judges and
lawyers.""2 The authors are content that such "precedents" allow judges
henceforth to invoke them as the centerpiece of decisionmaking. Thus,
through the gradual adoption by legislatures and courts of preferences for
primary caretaker and psychological parent in place of former gender or
blood tie preferences, "the law may come to reflect explicitly in judicial
precedent or in statute the 'current' state of knowledge from child
development."
53
Yet, advocating that judges be wary of making judgments on their own
about the best interests of a particular child is inconsistent with encourag-
ing them to be adventurous in remaking the fabric of the law itself by
adopting the "Best Interests" books as the governing principle for deciding
all child custody cases. By what professional standard or knowledge does a
judge make so global a change in the law, affecting not one but all
children?
The authors seem to say that if a prevailing statute is not in conformity
with those principles, the judge need not abide by it. How does a judge
avoid a statute he does not like? The authors suggest an interesting for-
mulation: Would the application of the precedent or statutory provision in
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hardly a prescription for judicial restraint or an answer to their call else-
where for limits on judicial discretion. At the end of the day, the authors
seek to curb individual judicial discretion in order to substitute universal
judicial adoption of their tenets of child custody. It takes a Founding Fa-
ther's confidence to impose a constitution-like framework on a field of law
which, once ratified, thereafter drastically limits the power of all partici-
pants in the process.
III. A FALLIBLE WORLD
The authors surely have rendered a service to the various professions
they treat by heightening our awareness of the errors to which members
of those professions too easily fall prey. Those are errors this reviewer
knows from courtroom experience. Experts from a variety of disciplines
commonly rely on personal biases and casually attained knowledge, un-
consciously overestimating their own role.
The authors' sound, sensible advice, however, must be evaluated against
the backdrop of the principles enunciated in the first two books of the
trilogy. The authors still understandably believe that adherence to the key
tenets of the first two books will avoid many of the situations they describe
in the third book, in which child care professionals and judges find them-
selves overreaching or conflicted. IBIC abounds in examples that show
that even if good judges and mental health professionals keep to their lim-
its, they make wrong decisions if the governing legal rules are wrong. If
the rules are wrong, does it make a difference how straight you play?
That is not to say that even professionals who keep within their limits
never err. Professionals are fallible and will not always act according to
the standard of prudence that these books prescribe. Some will inflict in-
jury to the child in the first round of contact between the child and the
state. Thus it is disturbing that, as examples in IBIC illustrate, BBIC and
BBIC II commandments on finality and absoluteness of initial decisions
would prevent a court from setting some of those wrongs right the second
time around."
54. Although the authors adhere in the main to their promise to make judgments on the profes-
sional wisdom of the participants in their case studies based on the principles enunciated in IBIC
rather than on the principles of custody placement discussed in the other two books, inconsistencies
between roles and rules confront the reader of the entire trilogy. One instance is the Rose case, promi-
nently featured as an example of an eminent judge making a custody decision on the basis of his own
psychological analysis of the parents. See pp. 21-28. Although a reader may readily agree with the
authors' criticism of the judge's attempt at amateur psychiatry and its unfortunate aftereffects on the
child, she must also take note of the fact that the judge corrected the custody decision four years later,
based upon unanimous expert testimony that the child had not thrived in the meantime. Thus, even if
the case was initially decided wrong, the error was eventually corrected. But the authors' insistence on
finality in custody decrees laid out in BBIC and BBIC II would have prevented any reopening of the
decree (in the absence of physical neglect or abuse), and presumably the child would have continued
to suffer. What then is worse for the child, the first mistake of the judge stemming from his misguided
psychiatry, or the failure to rectify that mistake due to the presumption that continuity of care must
predominate over all else?
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I am also concerned that the authors, and decisionmakers of all kinds,
should recognize that strict adherence to conflict of interest concerns and
an acute awareness of the limitation of one's own expertise, however de-
sirable, could require that an ever-expanding number of disciplines be
drawn into the child placement process. As the number of professionals
involved grows, the time required for thoughtful decisionmaking enlarges,
and the expense to society increases. At the same time the number of child
custody cases grows ever more ominous: In 1987, the Legal Aid Society
expected to handle 17,000 cases of child abuse and neglect in New York
City alone (a seventy-five percent increase over the previous year).55 Stric-
tures on the part any given discipline can legitimately play in the place-
ment process and awareness of the dangers of going beyond one's own
professional territory inevitably lead to decisionmaking that is more thor-
ough but slower and more expensive. Is society willing to pay the price?
Or will the principles the authors espouse apply only to those private
custody cases where both sides have money enough to play by the rules?
These are important questions, because these are influential books. The
"Best Interests" trilogy is a striking example of how quickly legal doctrine
can change to accommodate new information and, more problematically,
new theories from other disciplines. We have only to look at the sources
cited or argued in Brown v. Board of Education56 or Roe v. Wade,57 the
prime examples of judicial lawmaking in our century, to recognize the
influence on the law of ideas from outside the law.58 Yet the law cannot
In another case study, the judge, bound by a statute preventing the court from restricting a parent's
visitation right unless doing so would endanger the child's emotional health, nonetheless did exactly
what the principles in BBIC and BBIC II call for: he reduced the visits at the request of the primary
caretaker parent. But he did so against the testimony of an expert witness that the child's emotional
health would not be endangered. Although the authors are faithful to the principle that two wrongs do
not make a right for purposes of the third book, the reader is given distinctly conflicting messages. If
the recommendations of the first two volumes controlled in this case, the judge would have been
absolutely correct in upholding the mother's absolute authority to regulate the father's visits.
Though the third book tries conscientiously to separate means and ends, a reader of all three works
comes away with the notion that they are an integrated whole and that IBIC is an orphan abandoned
by its natural parents. For the difference in approach between IBIC and its predecessor volumes, see
supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
55. Marriott, Family Court Is Struggling With Caseload, Experts Say, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15,
1987, at 54, col. 1.
56. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58. In Brown v. Board of Education the Supreme Court rejected the "separate but equal" doc-
trine. In so doing, the Court relied on social science and psychological studies indicating that segre-
gated public education has a detrimental effect on black children. See 347 U.S. at 494-95 & n.11
("Modem" psychological authority, among other sources, indicates that "[sleparate educational facili-
ties are inherently unequal").
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court adopted the much-criticized "trimester approach" in an effort
to balance the competing interests of the state and the individual. In identifying three incrementally
important state interests, the Court related each interest to one of three stages of fetal viability. The
Court drew on the accepted medical practice and technology of the time for its understanding of fetal
viability. See, e.g., 410 U.S. at 148-49. Critics of the trimester approach, among them Justice
O'Connor, have called this approach "completely unworkable" because our knowledge of fetal viabil-
ity varies with "accepted medical practice" at any given time. See Akron v. Akron Center For Repro-
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careen back and forth in its most fundamental principles as new and at-
tractive theories emerge on the scene. Some commentators have suggested
that new theories be put to proof stringently before they are allowed to
influence the development of judge-made law in more than minimal
ways."9 The differing sides of new theories, runs this line of argument,
ought to be formally argued out in court by the parties or, if the parties
are not qualified, by distinguished amici. The judge should not change
direction in the law merely by judicially noticing a new theory. 0 This
proposed reform may be overkill, but some reform is needed. Right now
we have no tenets for instructing judges in picking and choosing among
ideas in the exploding world of information.
How then does the judicial marketplace select winners and losers
among theories? What part do media advertising, clever packaging, or
friendly reviewers play in determining which ideas and theories win out?
The proverbial war of expert witnesses has now escalated into a war of
Thought leaders who may influence the rules of law by which all
cases-not just the immediate ones before the courts-are decided.
The "Best Interests" trilogy is a prominent example of the persuasive-
ness of Thought leaders. The authors are skilled lawyers, psychiatrists,
child development experts, and communicators. They frankly admit that
many of their ideas are rooted in one branch of psychoanalytic theory and
are value preferences. Yet, they advocate that judges and agency person-
nel, with only scant qualifications to make the decision, freely adopt their
ideas over other theories.
VI. CONCLUSION
These three small books illustrate how important the issue of child
placement is and how fast and far the power of ideas can change the
law." They illustrate as well the folly of theories that judges-at any
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 454, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59. Davis, supra note 10, at 1598 ("It is unwise. . . to leave judges 'unrestricted' in the investi-
gation and determination of legislative and background facts"; "When it becomes clear that disputable
background or legislative facts will be important to the outcome of litigation, judges should encourage
the parties to participate in consideration of those facts" and should correct for any litigation imbal-
ances). See the IBIC authors' brief discussion of this problem at pp. 69-70 (judges must bring their
own special expertise to bear in leading cases).
60. See Davis, supra note 10, at 1593-1604.
61. BBIC has had immense influence in child placement decisionmaking. Peggy Davis' study
shows that between 1963 and 1984 it was cited in 193 court cases. See id. at 1546. It undoubtedly
affected many more. The psychological parent theory became a common backdrop for findings about a
specific child's best interests and was used to support particular interpretations of common law rules
or statutes and even to determine the scope of established constitutional protections for natural par-
ents. The Davis study also showed, however, that the psychological parent theory was most often used
successfully by the state to limit the rights of natural parents in favor of adoptive ones. In such cases
the "expert" evidence supporting BBIC went generally unrebutted. BBIC's theories enjoyed less suc-
cess in fights between parents where each side had its own expert on child development theory.
Judges who relied on the tenets of BBIC often failed to acknowledge they were radically changing
the law of child custody in their jurisdictions. In contrast, judges who rejected BBIC usually did so on
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level-simply declare and interpret existing law rather than guide it to-
ward new frontiers. Our current leaders worry about "judicial lawmak-
ing" at the highest levels, the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts.
In truth, much more important law may be made by judges in "people's
courts" at the state trial level. That process, too, deserves close attention.
the grounds they were not authorized to change existing law on the basis of a book. Still, "judges
convinced of the validity of psychological parent theory not only read ambiguous statutory language in
ways that facilitated application of the theory, but also blinded themselves to statutory language that
seemed to inhibit its application." Id. at 1569.
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